

Medicine Shortages – Causes and Approaches to Improvements Clinical Needs/Risks Assessment

EAHP Academy Seminar

19 – 21 October 2018, Warsaw, Poland

Nenad Miljković

Hospital Pharmacist

Public-health Professional

Conflict of Interest


- Nothing to disclose

Outline

- Medicine shortages - prescription and administration
- Prospective risk assessment
- Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (HFMEA)
- Prioritization (First risk- First needs)
- Implications to real healthcare settings and an initial analysis of the results


POE and CPOE Hospital

* Physician Order Entry / Computer Physician Order Entry




Implications to Real Healthcare Settings

Risks and Hazards



The Flow of Information



Proactive Risk Assessment

- 1) Reduce the likelihood of patient harm
- 2) Seek the best solution in times of medicine shortages



Why Risk Assessment?

- Proactively detect risks that could cause patient harm
- Describe and rate risks based on probability and severity
- Prioritise detected risks
- Propose actions to reduce risks
- Simulate processes using the proposed actions aiming at reducing risks

Risks Associated with Medicine Shortages

- Incorrect dosage of the substitute medicine prescribed
- Improper administration of the substitute medicine
- New drug-drug interactions not reviewed
- Onset effects not properly assessed - no information on treatment-effect delays
- Adverse effect profiles not reviewed

Prospective Risk Analysis

Common in:

- Chemotherapy
- Blood transfusions
- Drug prescription
- Compounding parenteral nutrition
- Drug distribution systems
- Continuous drug infusions
- Dialysis
- Drug administration analysis

Uncommon in other areas.
Particularly drug shortages

Van Tilburg CM, Leistikow IP, Rademaker CMA, Bierings MB, van Dijk ATH. Health care failure mode and effect analysis: a useful proactive risk analysis in a pediatric oncology ward. *Quality & Safety in Health Care*. 2006;15(1):58-63.

Castro Vida MÁ, Martínez de la Plata JE, Morales-Molina JA, et al. Identification and prioritisation of risks in a hospital pharmacy using healthcare failure mode and effect analysis *Eur J Hosp Pharm* 2017;0:1-6.

Rodriguez-Gonzalez CG, Martin-Barbero ML, Herranz-Alonso A, et al. Use of failure mode, effect and criticality analysis to improve safety in the medication administration process, *J Eval Clin Pract*. 2015 Aug;21(4):549-59.


Prospective Risk Assessment

- Critical evaluation of the processes involved for medicine substitution in shortages
 - Causes of failure modes detected which may lead to adverse events coming from the prescription and administration of medicines
 - Prioritise interventions that need to be implemented to provide adequate medicine substitution according to failure modes

Treatment Second. Risk Assessment First.

- The healthcare setting in question
- How healthcare services are organized and provided
- IT infrastructure
- Communication channels - multidisciplinary cooperation

Proactive Medicine Shortage Management via Risk Control



Risk Assessment-Clinical Needs Assessment

- Clinical need to manage risks
- Replacement / alternative risks
- Internal support and external communication


The Parenteral Drug Association (PDA) Technical Report 68



PCMO®

Paradigm Change in
Manufacturing Operations®

2014



Medicine Shortage Prevention and Response Plan Risk-Triage Model



Risk Register of Medicine Shortages

Generic name	Potential shortage risk	Risk source	Affected internal area	Initial risk level	Risk indicators	Intended risk-control measures	Expected risk level after corrective measures	Responsible party	Status


Risk-triage Model

- Identify the risk level for the patient based on the availability of an alternative medicine and its therapeutic use

Risk	Therapeutic Use of Products	Availability of Alternatives	Likelihood of Shortage
High	Life supporting or life sustaining	No Alternatives Available	High likelihood of shortage
Medium	Acute short term or chronic long term	Alternative Products Available: Similar Therapy	Moderate likelihood of shortage
Low	Other indications	Exact Product Available but in Other Presentations	Low likelihood of shortage

Risk-triage Model

- Determine the likelihood of a medicine shortage for a particular medicine




Risk-triage Model

- Establish the risk-priority level based on the projected impact to the patient and the likelihood of a medicine shortage

2. At each risk level consider the likelihood of a drug shortage
3. Define priority

		Likelihood of Shortage		
		High	Moderate	Low
Therapeutic Use & Consequences if Product not Available	Risk Level A	Risk Priority Level 1	Risk Priority Level 1	Risk Priority Level 2
	Risk Level B	Risk Priority Level 1	Risk Priority Level 2	Risk Priority Level 3
	Risk Level C	Risk Priority Level 2	Risk Priority Level 3	Risk Priority Level 3

Basic Example



Risk-triage Model

- Plan and implement risk control measures



Risk Assessment and Management

- Practitioner input
- Watch list
- Early identification
- Assessments based on existence and availability


Medicines Watch List

- Antibiotics, antifungals and antivirals
- Antidotes and treatments for poisonings
- Emergency and Critical Care
- Vaccines
- Specific Immunoglobulins
- Anticonvulsants
- Obstetrics

How do we Assess and Verify?



Medicine Substitute



Proactive Risk Assessment Models



Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA)

Healthcare Failure Mode Effect Analysis (HFMEA)

Operational Risk Management (ORM)

Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP)

Root Cause Analysis (RCA)

Is the HFMEA Merely an Academic Exercise?



Healthcare Failure Mode Effect Analysis (HFMEA)

Process flow diagramming



```
graph TD; A[Process flow diagramming] --> B[Hazard scoring matrix]; B --> C[Potential vulnerabilities assessment];
```


Hazard scoring matrix

Potential vulnerabilities assessment

Healthcare Failure Mode Effect Analysis (HFMEA)

- HFMEA analyzes a process:
 - Precisely
 - In a stepwise matter
 - Can encounter failure modes which do not qualify as high risk
 - The HFMEA team can still give recommendations for these non-high risk failure modes

Healthcare Failure Mode Effect Analysis (HFMEA)



HFMEA as applied to Several Hospitals Across Europe

- Is the HFMEA a valid proactive tool to evaluate a circumscribed healthcare process like prescription up to and including administration of reserve antibiotic in the hospital wards/inpatient setting with a high detection rate of potential adverse events?

?

HFMEA Steps

Step 1- Define the topic

Step 2- Assemble the team

Step 3- Describe the process as a diagram

Step 4- Conduct the analysis

Step 5- Identify actions and outcome measures

Step 1 Define the Topic



5-6 Primary Process Steps

Avoid problem statements

Show proactive way to minimise risks


NOT “Preventing inappropriate medicines substitution during a medicine shortage”

BUT “Providing adequate and optimal medicine substitution during a medicine shortage”


Step 2 - Assemble the Team




Step 3 - Describe the Process as a Diagram



Step 3 Describe the Process as a Diagram



Step 3 Describe the Process as a Diagram



Step 4 Conduct a Hazard Analysis

- List failure modes, causes and effects
- Determine severity and probability
- Use hazard scoring matrix
- Use the Decision tree for analysis
- Propose actions
- Recalculate the scores


Severity and Probability

Severity	
Catastrophic event	Major event
Patient Outcome: Death or permanent loss of function (sensory, motor, physiologic, or intellectual)	Permanent lessening of bodily functioning (sensor, motor, physiologic, or intellectual), disfigurement, surgical intervention required, increased length of stay for 3 or more patients, increased level of care for 3 or more patients
Moderate event	Minor event
Increased length of stay or increased level of care for 1 or 2 patients	No injury, nor increased length of stay nor increased level of care
Probability	
Frequent	Likely to occur immediately or within a short period (may happen several times in one year)
Occasional	Probably will occur (may happen several times in 1 to 2 years)
Uncommon	Possible to occur (may happen sometime in 2 to 5 years)

HFMEA Scoring Matrix

Probability	Severity				
		Catastrophic (4)	Major (3)	Moderate (2)	Minor (1)
	Frequent (4)	16	12	8	4
	Occasional (3)	12	9	6	3
	Uncommon (2)	8	6	4	2
	Remote (1)	4	3	2	1

HFMEA Decision Tree



Healthcare Settings

A

- 8 Failure Modes
- 38 Failure Mode Causes


B

- 13 Failure Modes
- 33 Failure Mode Causes

C


- 10 Failure Modes
- 18 Failure Mode Causes

Example HFMEA Key Words




Antibiotic Substitution-Research Site A

What to check and in what order



Antibiotic Substitution-Research Site A



Proposed Actions-Research Site A

Provide

Online access and sufficient data on AB spectrum of activity

IT support at the ward/pharmacy


Purchase

software (Lexi-Comp) and receive software PIM-Check


Archive obsolete paper literature to be replaced by up-to-date online resources on AB spectrum of activity

Antibiotic Substitution-Research Site B

What to check and in what order



Antibiotic Substitution-Research Site B



Proposed Actions-Research Site B

Provide

IT support at ward/pharmacy

SOPs for gathering information/daily ward stock assessment

Internal/external protocols of communication

Purchase


Software Lexi-Comp

Receive free software PIM-Check


Intensify multidisciplinary collaboration

Antibiotic Substitution-Research Site C

What to check and in what order



Antibiotic Substitution-Research Site C



Proposed Actions-Research Site C

Provide

- IT support regarding administration patterns
- Full supervision of contracted staff by senior staff
- Efficient less time consuming communication
- IT which actively cross-check lab data

Prioritise

Define list of medicines for which validation is a necessity

Define group of fragile patients for supervision

Practical Implications of HFMEA

Identifying and prioritise risks in hospital pharmacies

Preventing chemotherapy errors


Preventing risk to patients and medical practitioners using radiology medical devices in hospitals

Testing surgical instrument sterilization in response to positive biological indicators

Evaluating selected risk processes of the emergency surgery department

Prioritization Depends on the Context

- High hazard scores for FM require quick measures
- Lower hazard scores (below 8) must be reassessed as HFMEA methodology provides a more precise analysis of the process



Key Messages

- Using the HFMEA only for one process is feasible
- Be aware of potential frustration among team members due to the effort required for the HFMEA
- Do not immediately eliminate low hazard score failure modes prior to discussion within the team
- When proposing actions to control or eliminate failure modes, be aware of the real constraints posed by healthcare settings and the feasibility of each proposed action
- Think of how your medicine substitution system works

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION

